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NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter involves three consolidated actions for
damages against the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, and
Gibbons & Reed Company based on flooding damage
which occurred in two storms during a State highway construction project. By order of the Court (R. 59) and pursuant to Rule 42(b), the issue of liability was tried separately,
reserving for later proceedings the question of damages.
The Defendants State of Utah and Salt Lake County cross
claimed against Gibbons & Reed Company.
DISPOSITION I N LOWER COURT
A trial before a jury was held in the Court of the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge in the Third
Judicial District Court on March 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, and 18, 1974. A special verdict was returned
by the jury upon interrogatories submitted to it. The jury
found that the highway project of the State of Utah was
unreasonably defective or dangerous and that the Plaintiffs were damaged as a proximate result. (R. 720-23) The
jury also found that Salt Lake County unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition in the utilization
of its storm drain system and that all Plaintiffs (except
Richard Grotepas who had not sued the County) were
damaged as a proximate result. (R. 723-24) In addition,
the jury found that Salt Lake County was negligent in
failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities
for the highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered
damage as a proximate result thereof. (R. 728) Finally,
the jury found that Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to protect
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the project during construction and that this negligence
proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs. (R. 728)
An amended Order and Judgment was entered on
May 15, 1974, under which the Court found that the
State of Utah is liable for damages to all Plaintiffs as a
result of the flood which occurred on August 17, 1969.
(R. 776-77) The State was also adjudged liable for
damages incurred by Plaintiffs Kunkel for flooding on
April 3, 1969. (R. 777-78) However, contrary to the findings of the jury, the Court ruled that the County of Salt
Lake and Gibbons & Reed Company were not liable for
any damages suffered by any Plaintiffs. (R. 778) The
Court also ruled that Gibbons & Reed Company was not
liable for any damages under the cross claims of the State
of Utah and Salt Lake County, and awarded costs in favor
of Plaintiffs and against the State of Utah and in favor
of Gibbons & Reed Company against Plaintiffs. (R. 778)
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs-Appellants seek an order from this
Court directing the trial court to modify its judgment in accord with the jury's verdict holding Salt Lake
County and Gibbons & Reed Company liable jointly and
severally with the State of Utah for the damages incurred
by the Plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs in this action are all homeowners residing in an area immediately west of Wasatch Boulevard near 4500 South in Salt Lake County. (Ex. 6P) This
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general area is located on the base slopes of Mt, Olympus
which rises sharply from the valley floor as part of the
Wasatch Front. (Ex. IP) The Defendant Gibbons & Reed
Company is a large Utah construction company. (R. 17751777)
The Highway Construction

Project

In 1968, Gibbons & Reed Company was awarded a
contract by the State of Utah to construct a segment of an
interstate highway running north and south from Interstate 80 to approximately 4700 South following the route
of old Wasatch Boulevard along the base slopes of the
Wasatch Front. (R. 1776, Ex. 6P) The portion of this
project relevant to this proceeding commences at 3900
South and runs on a downgrade to 4600 South and then
rises sharply to join the old Wasatch Boulevard in a temporary terminus at approximately 4700 South. Virtually
the entire portion of this section of the highway lies below
the natural surface of the surrounding terrain. Thus, the
highway was situated in an excavated "cut" which intercepted the natural drainage channels flowing down the
mountainside from east to west. (R. 909, Ex. IP) The
point at which the downgrade ended at 4600 South and
the rise to the temporary terminus commenced is described as a "grade sag" (R. 1104) and in fact formed a basin
with only a small embankment on the west side protecting
homes below and to the west of the project. (R. 1107-09)
In the construction process, Gibbons & Reed Company followed the State's plans but was unrestricted in
two important areas: (1) It was given discretionary responsibility to protect the project during construction, and
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(2) it was able to use its discretion in determining what
sequence to accomplish the various steps of the project.
(See R. 1786, 1787)
As of April 3, 1969 (the date of the first flood), the
cut had been made across the slope. The storm drain system for the highway had not been completed. As of August 17, 1969 (the date of the second flood), the concrete
road beds had been laid. (R. 1475-77) The cut banks had
been denuded. (See Exs. 6P, 32P, 33P, 30P, 105D, 95D,
104D, 68P, 67P, 107D) No grass, sod or other materials
had been placed permanently or temporarily to prevent
erosion (Id.). The highway storm drain system had been
connected to the County system, but no effort had been
made to insure that either system was free of obstruction.
(R. 1555, 1725, 1726, 1293) No permanent or temporary
storm grates had been placed over the entrances to the
storm drain system laterals to prevent debris from washing
into the storm system. (R. 1298, 1557, I860) Protective
curbing and diking had been removed. (R. 1760, 1520A,
1354)
The Storm Drain System
Salt Lake County retained the engineering firm of
Caldwell, Richards & Sorenson to prepare a Master Storm
Drain Study for the County in 1964. (Ex. 73P) That study
showed that the interstate highway involved in this litigation was contemplated. The Master Study, however, did
not anticipate the temporary terminus or end of the freeway at 4700 South. Instead, the drawings in the Study
showed that the highway was to continue southward for
over a mile. (See 73P at fig. 23)
5
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In addition, the Study specifically observed that the
area in question was highly dangerous in terms of flooding potential. Concerning this subject, the Study contained
the following observations (Ex. 73P):
Listed briefly, some of the causes of flooding, and
damage from flooding, throughout Salt Lake
County are the following:
•»•

*& H»

In the Foothills and Mountainside Slopes:
(a) Flash floods on steep gullies and ravines.
(b) Unwise filling of natural drainage
courses, and failure to provide culverts or underground drainage systems.
•

#

#

Much flood damage could be prevented and drainage problems simplified, with proper planning
and perhaps some legal restrictions. (Pages 1, 2)
Once disturbed in grading, trenching or other
types of movement this area {the mountain slopes
and foothills} becomes highly vulnerable to washing and displacement when water applied to the
surface becomes greater than can be readily absorbed. (Page 11)
Rain may come in low volume steady fall over a
period of many hours or it may come as a high
intensity, short duration storm dropping a very
heavy flow over a concentrated area or over a
relatively large area. When this occurs so that
rapid runoff from steeper slopes combines with
that falling or running off the flatter slopes, there
is created the problem of providing for the safe,
orderly removal of this water from the area of
origination to the final point of disposition. (Page
14)
6
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Despite the relatively great cost of storm drainage, its provision to the maximum possible extent
is, in every modern community, becoming regarded as a fundamental necessity. (Page 44)
A program of cleaning and repairing of these existing facilities wiUbe necessary, as it was found during the field investigations that many catch basins
and pipes are completely filled up. At the very
least, this has caused nuisance to the public in the
past. (Page 66)
[T)he engineering of storm drainage for hillside
areas requires special considerations. A great deal
more control of runoff waters is necessary because
of the increased velocities created by building
houses and streets on slopes where previously vegetation helped to absorb and lessen the runoff from
a rain storm. Salt Lake County has allowed some
hillside development without adequate provision
for storm drainage. Subdividers have been permitted to fill in natural drainage courses and construct homes on the fill, without installing culverts or storm drain systems. In the area near 4500
South and Wasatch Boulevard, much damage has
taken place during the following rainstorms, due
to lack of adequate drainage facilities . . . The construction of Proposed Storm Drain " G G " is intended to relieve this situation. Construction of the
Belt Route within the next 5 years will result in
the relocation of Wasatch Boulevard to the east of
its present location between Oakcliff Drive and
Bernada Drive. Early construction of this portion of System "GG", in cooperation with the Utah
Highway Department should have high priority.
(Pages 78-79)
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The evidence presented at the trial (and discussed
more fully below) indicated the following matters:
(1) Storm Drain " G G " was never constructed. (R.
1156,1197)
(2) Wasatch Boulevard was relocated and the
effective use of the Boulevard as a drainage channel was
eliminated because the high curb on the west side of the
street was removed, allowing runoff water to flow across
the Boulevard and down onto the freeway. (R. 1354,
1520A, 1540, 1543-44, 1558, 1760, 1762, 1763)
(3) The Storm Drains provided to drain the area
were not adequate in size to carry the anticipated runoff
from even a storm of anticipated volume and intensity.
(R. 1669, 1681, 1201)
(4) N o maintenance program was established by the
County regarding the drains in question. As far as the
County was aware, they had never been cleaned prior to
the flooding in this case. (R. 1293, 1726)
(5) The connection between the Highway drain and
the County drain did not conform to sound engineering
principles because a large pipe was drained into a smaller
pipe. (R. 1759, 1712)
(6) N o permanent or temporary screens or grates
were required or installed to protect lateral intakes. (R.
1860,1292,1298)
(7) At the time of the flood in the present case, the
Storm Drain System was inadequate. (R. 1156)
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The Storms
On April 3, 1969, a heavy rain storm resulted in runoff water washing down earth and debris from the construction site into the yard of Plaintiffs Kunkel. (R. 1029,
Ex. 53P, R. 1048) Mr. and Mrs. Kunkel brought this matter to the attention of all Defendants through personal
conversations and also through correspondence. (R. 1031,
1032, 1034, 1035, 1044)
On Sunday, August 17, 1969, at approximately 6:00
p.m., a heavy rainstorm occurred in the vicinity of 4500
South and Wasatch Boulevard. The amount of rain which
fell in a period of about 45 minutes approximately 2.5
inches. (R. 1260, 1334, 1307-08) The jury found that the
storm was not an "Act of God." (Finding G, R. 728)
The testimony revealed that storms of high intensity
occur along the Wasatch Front and that the month of
August is the month in which such storms most frequently
occur. (R. 1265, 1305, 1603, 1614)
As the rain fell, runoff water from the residential
area above Wasatch Boulevard flowed down from the
Olympus Cove area to the relocated Boulevard. (R. 1762)
In prior storms, such runoff water was channeled south
by the Boulevard to the "Shadow Mountain Area" which
is located nearly one mile south of the Plaintiffs' homes.
(R. 1558) None of the Plaintiffs had ever encountered
flooding damage prior to the construction here involved.
(R. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860, 880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024,
1058, 1063, 1068, 1078, 1432)
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Because the Boulevard no longer had a high curb or
dike on the west edge, the flood waters were allowed to
cascade over the Boulevard and to flow onto the new
freeway below. As they did so, substantial quantities of
earth from the denuded cut banks were eroded. (See Exs.
95D, 101D, 104D, 105D, 67P, 68P) At the time of the
floods, the concrete highway road beds were in place but
the cut ditches and barrow pits were unlined and unprotected. (R. 1488, 1475-77) The concrete road beds,
constructed by defendants State of Utah and Gibbons &
Reed, intercepted the flood waters which otherwise would
have flowed west and downhill, substantially north of the
Plaintiffs' homes. (R. 1558, Ex. 8P) The intercepted flood
waters were channeled south and downhill in the highway
cut to the low point of the grade sag. At that point, a large
backup of water and debris was created. (Ex. 8P) Storm
drains were inadequate to carry off the water. They had
become completely filled with debris—some rocks 14
inches in diameter. (See Ex. 84P) The flood waters soon
broke through the embankment on the west side of the
freeway. A great torrent of water then rushed out of the
grade sag reservoir and flooded the homes of the Plaintiffs. (Ex. 8P) The County storm sewer, which had become completely obstructed, also emitted water from two
manholes which erupted in geyser-like fashion, also flooding the Plaintiffs' homes. (R. 806, 845)
The Damage
The evidence showed and the jury found that all 34
homes of the Plaintiffs sustained damages as a result of
the flooding. (Finding A(2), R. 721-23) Counsel for the
10
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State and County advised the trial court that the total
damages exceeded $100,000.00.
The issue of the exact amount of damages was reserved for a later hearing.
>
The Defendants'

Involvement

The State. The jury found that "with respect to the
flood condition on August 17, 1969, the highway project
of the State of Utah, including the storm drain system, was
unreasonably defective or dangerous/' and that all of the
Plaintiffs had damage to their property as a proximate
result of the State's project. (Finding A(l) and (2), R. 721)
With respect to the flooding of the property of Mr. and
Mrs. Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury found that "the
improvements and highway project created by the State
of Utah was unreasonably defective or dangerous." (Finding D ( l ) and (2), R. 727)
On the basis of the jury's findings, the trial court
entered judgment against the State of Utah.
The County. The jury found that with respect to the
flooding condition of August 17, 1969, ''Salt Lake County
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition
in the utilization of its storm drain system and that this
caused damage to all Plaintiffs." (Finding B(l) and (2),
R. 723) The jury also found that Salt Lake County was
negligent in failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the highway project and that the Plaintiffs were damaged as a proximate result of said negligence. (Finding I, R. 728) With respect to Plaintiffs
11
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Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury found that "Salt Lake
County created an unreasonably defective or dangerous
condition in the utilization of the storm sewer system/'
causing damage to the Kunkels. (Finding E(l) and (2),
R.727)
The trial court declined to enter judgment against
the County.
Gibbons & Reed Company. The jury found that
"Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent in that it failed
to take reasonable precautions to protect the project during construction.'' This negligence proximately caused
damage to Plaintiffs. (Findings J(l) and K, R. 728).
The trial court also declined to enter judgment against
Gibbons & Reed Company.
Limitation on Liability
Under the Governmental Immunity Act, every policy
of insurance purchased by a governmental entity must
provide property damage coverage to a limit of not less
than $50,000.00 in any one accident. (U.C.A. 63-30-29)
Any judgment over the insurance coverage minimum
amounts for property damage liability must be reduced by
the court to a sum equal to the minimum requirements or
the actual insurance coverage. (U.C.A. 63-30-34)

12
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ARGUMENT
Summary

of Plaintiffs9

Position

The Plaintiffs contend that the Trial Court erred
when it failed to enter judgment on the jury's verdict with
respect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed; that the
record strongly supports the jury's verdict both with respect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed; that the
damages incurred by Plaintiffs constitute an inverse condemnation by the State of Utah and County of Salt Lake
for the entire amount of which the State and County are
liable.
POINT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING
JUDGMENT INCONSISTENT W I T H THE
JURY'S FINDINGS.
The jury found that concerning the August 17, 1969,
flooding, Salt Lake County unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition in the utilization of its storm
drain system "and that this proximately caused damage to
all Plaintiffs." (Finding B(l) and (2), R.723) With respect
to the Plaintiffs Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury further
found "Salt Lake County created an unreasonably defective
or dangerous condition in the utilization of the storm
sewer system" and that this proximately damaged the
Kunkels. (Finding E(l) and (2), R. 727) The jury also
found that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing to
provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the
project. (Finding I, R. 728) The jury also found that Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent "in failing to take
13
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reasonable precautions to protect the project during construction" and that such negligence proximately caused
damage to Plaintiffs. (Finding J ( l ) and K, R. 728)
Despite these specific and clear findings, the Trial
Court refused to enter judgment against Salt Lake County
and Gibbons & Reed Company. This inconsistency between the jury's findings and the judgment constitutes
error.
Rule 39 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals
with "Trial by Jury or by the Court." Subsection (a)
deals with trial "By Jury," and states as follows:
When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon
the register of actions as a jury action. The trial
of all issues so demanded shall he hy jury, unless
* * * [exceptions not herein applicable.} [Emphasis added.}
The latitude which the trial court has regarding the
judgment to be entered in a case where special verdicts
have been utilized under U.R.C.P. Rule 49 has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
It is recognized that where a case is submitted to
the jury on special verdicts, the trial court may
make corrections of obvious errors or defects
therein, and he may make additional findings on
issues which have not been submitted to the jury,
but are necessary to settle the issues involved. But
when a party has demanded a trial by jury he is
entitled to have the jury find the facts, and it is
not the trial court's prerogative to make findings
inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the effect
14
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of the jury's findings. First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454
P.2d 886, 889 (1969). [Emphasis added.}
In that case, the trial judge made an additional finding
which in effect nullified a finding made by the jury. The
judge's additional finding was not allowed by the Utah
Supreme Court to defeat the finding of the jury.
The relationship between findings and the judgment
rendered thereon has been further stated as follows by the
Utah Supreme Court:
In Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239, this
Court held that a valid judgment must not only
rest upon pleadings but upon findings. It is fundamental that findings of fact and conclusions of law
must proceed entry of judgment. Fisher v. Emerson, 15 Utah 517, 50 P. 619; Billings v. Parsons,
17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730. "It is fundamental that the
conclusions of law must be predicated upon and
find their support in the findings of fact, and the
judgment must follow the conclusions of law" and
if the conclusions are at variance with the findings,
the Supreme Court will order the loiver court to
set aside its erroneous conclusions and substitute
the correct ones therefor. This is the law as announced in Parrot Bros. Company v. Ogden City,
50 Utah 512, 167 P. 807. And, again, we find in
Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370, that
conclusions of law must be based upon facts and
must be considered with the facts, and in like fashion, the Court's decree must rest upon legal conclusions and be consistent with them. A judgment,
if in conformity with the findings, will not be
disturbed. And, of course, the converse is true. A
judgment not in conformity with the findings can-

lb
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not be permitted to stand. Mason v. Mason, 160
P.2d 730, 732, 108 Utah 428 (1945). [Emphasis
added.}
Any confusion arising among interrogatories to a
jury and answers thereto should be resolved in accordance
with the following standard:
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in
connection with the correlation of interrogatories
with each other and their answers, they should be
so interpreted as to harmonize with the findings of
the jury if that can reasonably be done. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 275 (1952).
Here again, it is the intention of the jury which is controlling, not that of the judge.
The circumstances under which the court can amend
or correct a verdict are set forth in the following language
from 53 Am. Jur. Trials §1094, to which a footnote citation was made by the Utah Supreme Court in the quotation from the Lundahl case, supra.
A verdict in a civil case which is defective or
erroneous as to a mere matter of form not affecting
the merits or rights of the parties may be amended by the court to conform it to the issues and to
give effect to what the jury unmistakably found.
In fact, it is the duty of the judge to look after its
form and substance, so as to prevent a doubtful or
insufficient finding from passing into the records
of the court; and every reasonable construction
should be adopted for the purpose of working the
verdict into form so as to make it serve.
Thus, where the trial judge misinterprets or
fails to record the verdict the jury obviously in16
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tended to render, it has been held to be within the
power of the trial court to mold or amend the recorded verdict of the jury so as to make a verdict
which in form inaccurately expresses the jury's intention conform exactly to what the jury intended
to find, where the intention is obvious from the
record; and in the event of the failure of the trial
court so to mold the verdict the appellate court will
do so.
While the practice of amending verdicts in
matters of form is one of long standing, based on
principles of the soundest public policy in the furtherance of justice, it is strictly limited to cases
where the jury have expressed their meaning in an
informal manner. The court has no power to supply substantial omissions, and the amendment in
all cases must he such as to make the verdict conform to the real intent of the jury. The judge cannot, under the guise of amending the verdict, invade the province of the jury or substitute his verdict for theirs. After the amendment the verdict
must he not what the judge thinks it ought to have
been, but what the jury intended it to be. Their
actual intent, and not his notion of what they ought
to have intended, is the thing to be expressed and
worked out by the amendment. 53 Am. Jur. Trials
§1094 with 1973 pocket part addition inserted.
[Emphasis added.}
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do provide a
means whereby the verdict of a jury may be disregarded
and a judgment inconsistent therewith may be entered.
U.R.C.P. Rule 50(b), "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict" is intended,
* * * to permit the trial judge to submit the case
to the jury for their determination, then if the verdict goes adverse to the moving party, he can, when
17
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there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and
rule upon whether a jury question exists. Roche v.
Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855, 856 (1953).
However, a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is not to be inferred, presumed, or judicially
initiated, but must be specifically and timely made.
To apply for the arrest of a judgment on an adverse verdict, the motion must be definite and specific. In exercising authority under a statute or rule
of court to render a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the power of the court must be properly
invoked by the procedure therein provided, and
the judgment may be rendered only after a full
compliance with the provisions of the statute or
rule. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §119.
N o such motion having been made by Defendants Salt
Lake County or Gibbons & Reed Company, the District
Court had no authority to enter judgment contrary to the
jury verdict. Neither has there been, nor could there be,
a finding of an "absence of any substantial evidence to
support the verdict" (Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah
2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967)), as would be required in
order to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
even if such were otherwise proper.
The rule is firmly established that a jury verdict is
not to be upset if believable facts are adduced supporting
it. See, e.g., Estate of Hubbard, 30 Utah 2d 260, 516 P.2d
741 (1973). Other cases have reached the same result. See
Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925
(1956), where it was held that when evidence amply sustains a verdict, the courts should not overturn it.
18
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Similarly, in Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d
66 (I960), it was held that the verdict of a jury must not
be set aside unless a reasonable man could not come to
the same conclusion even when all evidence and inferences
fairly derived therefrom are taken in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
In Winchester v, Egan Farm Service, 4 Utah 2d 129,
288 P.2d 790 (1955), the Court reached a similar result,
stating that in the absence of a showing that a jury's
finding was not supported by evidence, the court should
not disturb the jury's finding. N o such showing has been
made here. Indeed, as shown below, the jury's verdict
is amply supported.
In other recent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has
ruled that judges should be reluctant to interfere with
jury verdicts and should not do so as long as there is any
reasonable basis in evidence to justify such verdicts.
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966).
Accord, Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d
430 (1964); Banks v. Shivers, 20 Utah 2d 25, 432 P.2d
339(1967).
In the present case, the trial court judge allowed the
case to go to the jury which then rendered a verdict consistent with the evidence and finding all Defendants liable.
But the trial court improperly departed from the jury
verdict and entered a judgment which is opposite in result
to the jury's findings relative to the liability of Salt Lake
County and Gibbons & Reed Company. Such a course of
judicial action is contrary to both the spirit and the letter
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of the jury trial system, is contrary to established rules of
law and procedure, and should not be permitted to stand.
The judgment should be modified to conform to the verdict.
POINT

II.

THE FACTS SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDINGS CONCERNING SALT LAKE COUNTY
A N D GIBBONS & REED.
A.

THE RECORD AMPLY SUPPORTS THE JURY'S
FINDINGS A N D THEREFORE THE COUNTY
SHOULD ALSO BE HELD LIABLE.

Plaintiffs proved their case against the County under
both the majority and dissenting opinions of Sanford v.
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
In that case a landowner was flooded during a State-sponsored construction project following a heavy rain storm.
The jury held the defendants liable under the applicable
statutes. The elements to be shown in this type of case as
required by the majority opinion in Sanford are (1) change
in the natural drainage flow; (2) creation of a drainage
system; (3) creation of a defective or dangerous condition; (4) knowledge of the danger; and (5) damage to
Plaintiffs. The dissent added the additional requirement
of a negligence showing. In this case the Plaintiffs established each of these elements as is more fully discussed
below.
1.

Change in the Natural Drainage

Flow.

Exhibit I P offered by Plaintiffs is an aerial photograph depicting the area in question and illustrating the
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natural drainage flows. The testimony of Professor Harry
Goode showed that the new highway intercepted the natural
drainage flows and gathered runoff water "in the same
way that a ditch would." (R. 909; see also Ex. 8-P)
By directing the runoff waters into storm drain Line
C of the County system, the County engineer admitted
that the natural drainage flow had ben changed. (R. 1711)
Also, the County permitted the State to connect the highway drainage system into the County system, thereby
becoming a party to the directing of runoff waters into
unnatural courses. (R. 1467) In addition, the County permitted the removal of the protective "dike" (R. 1763) or
high curbing along the western edge of old Wasatch
Boulevard which had formerly channeled runoff waters
south and away from the Plaintiffs. (R. 1520A, 1354,
1540, 1543-44, 1558, 1762). The lack of the Boulevard
dike is evident in Exhibits 30P, 32P, 33P, 102D, and 82P.
Each of the Plaintiffs testified that storm waters had
never caused damage to them prior to this project (see
R. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860, 880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024,
1058, 1063, 1068, 1078, 1432).
2.

Creation of a Drainage System.

There was no dispute that the County had created a
drainage system. Exhibit 73P (the Master Study) clearly
showed the County's plan and intent to create a system
for the area in question. The County participated in the
highway project by permitting the State to connect the
highway system directly into the County system which was
21
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extended through Line C of storm drain J J to accommodate the portion of the highway containing the grade sag
(see also R. 1467, Ex. 7P).
At the preconstruction conference held on May 29,
1968, the County was represented by the following individuals (see Ex. 7P):
William J. Wilson

County Highway Department

J. Rex MacKay

Director, County Flood Control

Marvin Melville

County Water System, Inc.

Lamont B. Gundersen

Director, County Highway Dept.

Earl Skillicorn

County Road System

A. H. Sorensen, Jr.

Engineer

These individuals participated in the joint planning of
the project particularly as it affected the interconnection
of the State project with the County facilities.
3.

Creation of a Defective or Dangerous

Condition.

At the time of the flood on August 17, 1969, storm
waters exceeding the capacity of the clogged County storm
drain Line C erupted from two manholes along the line,
spewing water about ten feet high. (R. 806) The manholes erupted because of the obstruction in the County
line. (R. 806) After the flood, Line C was found to be
two-thirds full of silt and debris (R. 1282) for a length
of about 700-800 feet. (R. 1288)
Prior to the flood and following the completion of
the connection to the County Line C, absolutely no effect
was made by the County or any other party to determine

22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

whether Line C was free from obstructions. (R. 1293,
1555, 1557, 1725-26) This was the case even though the
County was aware that any debris in the line would reduce its capacity. (R. 1661, 1517, Ex. 73P at page 66) In
fact, Line C had never been maintained at all prior to
the flood. (R. 1694, 1725-26) County officials charged
with flood control responsibilities even denied that there
was a County storm drain in the area immediately after
the flooding occurred. (R. 1293)
N o effort was made by the County to insist that the
highway drain system be protected by grates or other devices to prevent materials and debris from entering Line C
(R. 1298) As a result, all lateral intakes existing on the
project were open and unprotected (R. 1298) allowing
rocks and debris to enter the County's system. Expert witness Professor Cecil Jacobsen testified that it was not
good engineering practice to have such unprotected lead
drains, particularly during the vulnerable construction
phase of the project. (R. 1849-53) County witness Nielsen
testified that Line C was not designed to carry any substance other than water. (R. 1708). Thus, it was little
wonder that the system did not function properly.
In addition, the portion of Line C which was clogged
was constructed with less than a one percent slope for 660
feet. (R. 1707) Larger materials will settle out easier in
such areas. (R. 1659) With less than one foot drop in one
hundred horizontal feet, it is not surprising to find that
14-inch diameter rocks would not be flushed through
Line C. The County witness testified that a 14-inch rock
would materially reduce the capacity of the Line. (R.
1708)
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The County further permitted the State to connect a
42-inch line into the smaller 36-inch Line C. (R. 1712)
This connection occurred at the point the State highway
system connected to the troublesome Line C. Good engineering practice dictates that
pipe sizes should not decrease in the downstream
direction even though increased slope may provide
adequate capacity in the smaller pipe. Any debris
which enters a drain must be carried through the
system to the outlets, and the possibility of clogging
a smaller pipe with debris which may pass a larger
pipe is too great. (R. 1758-59)
Nevertheless, the County ignored this principle and permitted the State to connect the larger pipe into the smaller
downstream pipe. The principle was shown to be accurate
on August 17, 1969. Ten days were required for the
County employees to clean the debris from the smaller
pipe, Line C. (R. 1288)
In addition to the foregoing, the dangerous and defective character of the storm drain system was further
illustrated in the testimony of County witness Sorensen.
He testified that approximately 97.75 cubic feet per second of storm water was drained into Line C which was
designed to carry only 87 cubic feet per second, assuming
free-running water. (R. 1669) Moreover, Mr. Sorensen
agreed that in addition to the 97.75 cfs, other areas drained
into Line C which were not included in the total. (R. 1681)
Thus, even greater quantities of water would be present
to further overload the system. Professor Jacobsen testified (at R. 1156):
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The Court: The question was the planning
of the drainage system reasonably, meet reasonable
standards to meet the runoff to be expected, was
the sewer system capable of handling the reasonably anticipated runoff?
The Witness (Jacobsen): In my opinion, no
very definitely because the engineers also planned
another conduit or drain leading to the south to
intercept part of this very area. So that an additional load was placed upon the system as constructed, which made it inadequate to carry this amount
of runoff.
Q. (By Mr. Boyden): Now that additional
sewer which was not constructed, referred to in
the flood control report?
A.

Right.

In addition to the inadequate capacity of Line C,
the witnesses testified that the rainfall intensity chart
which was used to determine the anticipated runoff in the
area in question was insufficient and inapplicable. More
rain falls on the mountain slopes than on the Salt Lake
airport. (R. 1257, 1303, 1654-55) Nevertheless, the chart
that was used to determine runoff was based upon airport and downtown Salt Lake weather statistics. (R. 1257),
1709-11) It is not sound engineering practice for the
County to have used an inapplicable chart. (R. 1710)
Finally, the County permitted the removal of the
protective dike and curbing along Wasatch Boulevard
without providing for adequate drainage. This facilitated
the erosion and washout of cut banks and the subsequent
clogging of the County system.
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Thus, the evidence was overwhelming that the
County participated in the creation of a dangerous and
defective condition in the following ways: (1) it failed
totally to maintain its storm drain system; (2) it failed to
determine whether Line C when connected was free from
obstructions; (3) it failed to require that lead intakes were
protected from accepting debris and rocks particularly
during the construction period; (4) it permitted rocks
and debris to enter the system which was not designed to
handle such materials; (5) when the County agreed to
the connection with its line, it knew it had constructed
Line C with a very flat grade which made it susceptible
to clogging; (6) it permitted the State to connect a larger
drain pipe upstream to a smaller pipe also contributing
to clogging; (7) it permitted the State to drain runoff
water into a system which was already inadequate to
handle anticipated runoff; (8) it relied upon unsound data
in determining its requirements for runoff capacity; and
(9) it permitted the removal of protective diking and
curbing which would have directed the flood waters away
from Plaintiffs.
The foregoing nine items furnish more than a sufficient basis for the jury's findings that "Salt Lake County
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition
in the utilization of its storm drain system" (Finding B ( l ) ,
R. 723) and as required by the dissenting opinion in Sanford v. University of Utah, supra, "Salt Lake County was
negligent in failing to provide reasonable, adequate drainage facilities for the highway project/' (Finding I, (R.
728) Consequently, the trial court judge should have
entered judgment against Salt Lake County.
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4.

Salt Lake County Was Fully Aware of the Danger
Possible In This Case.

When the preconstruction conference was held on
May 29, 1968, the following relevant portion of the minutes reflects that the County was aware of the problems
involved in this case (Ex. 7P, page five):
VI.

County Planning.
*

*

*

Mackay [Director, Salt Lake County Flood Control}:
If we can start one and get going — we have
engineering done. We need to tie into 36-inch line
on Wasatch Blvd. which subsequently ties into
our storm sewer. We have three problems: (1)
sudden showers; (2) flood; (3) the public on our
necks. I don't have contractor's schedule. I would
suggest we sit down with the contractor and
schedule it out. Upper residential section run-off
will create problems.
See also R. 1751.
Other items of evidence also revealed the County's
awareness of these problems. For example, as set forth
in the Statement of Facts, supra, the County's Master
Storm Drain Study (Ex. 73P) also indicated such awareness. See pages 1-2 (referring to "flash floods" on mountain slopes), page 11 (referring to erosion of excavated
earth), page 14 (referring to runoff on steep slopes), and
page 66 (referring to the need of good maintenance programs and the existence of clogged drains and pipes).
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Most explicit is the section at pages 78-79 referring to
specific flood damage in the area near the Plaintiffs at
4500 South and Wasatch Boulevard.
Another example of County awareness is found in
Exhibit 12IP which was an article appearing in the Salt
Lake Tribune on July 31, 1965, describing flash floods
along the Wasatch Front and specifically stating:
Wasatch Boulevard in an area near 4400
South was covered with so much mud, rock and
debris that it was closed for several hours while
crews plowed it open.
Plaintiffs Kunkel also appraised the County of flooding problems in this area when they wrote several letters
preceding the August 17, 1969, flooding. (See Exs. 53P,
54P, and 6IP) County Commissioner Royal K. Hunt replied to Mrs. Kunkel on June 2, 1969:
. . . I have requested the Recreation Department to cooperate with and instruct the WBBA
and the Flood Control Department to provide
whatever protection is feasible for your property
to prevent flooding.
Obviously "whatever protection is feasible" was not provided by the County which failed to maintain its system
and permitted the removal of protective dikes and curbing in addition to all of the other shortcomings noted
above.
The County should also have been aware that August
is the prime month for cloudburst floods along the Wasatch
Front (R. 1303-05, 1265, 1603, 1614)
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Thus, County awareness of the potential danger in
this case was clearly established by the evidence.
5.

The Plaintiffs Were Injured As a Result of The
Dangerous and Defective Condition Created by
The County.

In both of its findings concerning Salt Lake County,
the jury expressly found that the Plaintiffs were proximately damaged as a result of County action. (Findings
B2, 12, R. 723, 728) The evidence supported these findings. Plaintiffs testified concerning each and every home
which was damaged. The path of the flood waters was
traced on Exhibit 6 by the witnesses showing each home
which was damaged. Numerous photographs of homes
damaged by the floodwaters and showing the path of the
floodwaters were also received in evidence, (see, e.g.,
108D, 50P, 51P, 52P, 19P, 21P, 48P, 49P, 26P, 27P, 46P,
12P, 13P, 14P, 15P, 25P, 24P, 20P, 22P, I I P , and 18P)
All of the Sanford Requirements

Were

Fulfilled.

As the foregoing has demonstrated, the requirements
set down in the Sanford decision were met. Thus, when the
trial court refused to enter judgment against the County
in accord with the jury's findings which were supported
by competent evidence, he committed error. This court
can correct that error by directing the trial court to enter
judgment against the County in favor of the Plaintiffs.*

* Plaintiff Richard Grotepas did not name the County as a Defendant
and is thus not entitled to be included in said judgment.
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The Trial Court Denied Defendants9 Motion for a
Directed Verdict.
At the close of all evidence, Defendants Salt Lake
and the State of Utah each moved for a directed verdict.
The trial court denied those motions. That denial with
respect to Salt Lake County was upon the basis that Plaintiffs at that time had established a prima facie case with
respect to each Defendant. The judge then submitted the
case to the jury upon special interrogatories. The findings
of the jury relating to the creation of a dangerous or defective condition and the negligence of the County were in
response to the only questions posed by the Court.
To refuse to enter judgment in accord with those
findings constitutes error which should be reversed.
B.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY'S FINDINGS CONCERNING GIBBONS & REED'S NEGLIGENCE.

Findings J(l) and K stated that Gibbons & Reed
Company was negligent in "failing to take reasonable precautions to protect the project during construction" and
that "such negligence proximately caused damage to
Plaintiffs." (R. 728) A review of pertinent evidence
shows that there was ample support for these findings.
1.

Gibbons & Reed Was Aware of the Flooding
Potential.

Like Salt Lake County, Gibbons & Reed was fully
aware of the flooding hazard which existed in the subject
area. Four Gibbons & Reed representatives were present
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at the preconstruction conference where fkftling, cloudburst, and runoff hazardsvere discussed. (Ex. 7P) In addition, Gibbons & Reed also was a recipient of correspondence from the Plaintiffs Kunkel. (See Ex. 54P) Mrs.
Kunkel states in one of her letters that she orally advised
Mr. Noel Gold of Gibbons & Reed of the flooding problem. (Ex. 54P)
Gibbons & Reed, being a large general contractor
in the Utah area, should have been aware of the likelihood of cloudburst floods in August along the Wasatch
Front. Gibbons & Reed was a defendant in the Sanford
case, and, therefore, had direct knowledge of the potential
for flood damage. *
Exhibit 12 IP, appearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Salt Lake City area, also served to provide added notice to Gibbons & Reed of the potential
flooding hazard in the subject area.
2.

Despite Knowledge of the Hazard, Gibbons &
Reed Took No Precautions To Protect the Project
During Construction.

As of August 17, 1969, the project was nearing completion. The denuded cut banks and unlined barrow pits
created an added danger to the exposed storm sewer system which had been connected.
Gibbons & Reed had removed the protective barrier
dike or curbing along Wasatch Boulevard and had elected

*The Sanford Flood occurred on July 17, 1967. 488 P.2d 742.
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not to replace it until a more advanced stage of the construction process. (R. 1762) This decision was discretionary
with Gibbons & Reed. (R. 1786) Similarly, Gibbons &
Reed had not placed any of the concrete ditch liners. (R.
1786) Finaly, no effort was made to temporarily prevent
cut bank erosion pending the planting of grass or sod,
or to protect lateral drain openings from eroded debris,
even though such erosion could be expected. (R. 1521)
Despite Gibbons & Reed's knowledge of the potential hazard, the company simply claimed that there was
"no reason" to take any temporary measures whatever to
protect the project. (R. I860) This calculated risk
obviously backfired, resulting in contributing to a large
part of the damage in this case. Gibbons & Reed gambled
that it would not rain during this critical construction
phase. They lost that gamble and now Gibbons & Reed,
not the Plaintiffs, should be made to pay for the losses.
3.

Temporary Protective Measures Would Have
Been Reasonable to Prevent Injury to Plaintiffs.

The specifications for the project require that Gibbons & Reed protect the project during construction and
provide for proper drainage of the project. (R. I860) Expert witness Professor Jacobsen testified that it would not
be good practice to leave lead drains which feed into a
closed drain line unprotected by grates particularly during
the period of construction. (R. 1849) Professor Jacobsen
further stated that clogfree drain covers could have been
used as a temporary device to protect the lateral storm
drain intakes during the construction period. (R. 1850-
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51; see also 1202) Also, he stated that one project with
which he was familiar, "ditch riders" had been employed
to ensure that drain intakes remained unobstructed during storms. (R. 1853)
Gibbons & Reed saw "no need" to protect the project
during this highly vulnerable construction phase in the
most highly vulnerable storm month in one of the most
highly vulnerable areas of the state. Given all the facts,
the jury obviously disagreed with Gibbons & Reed and
found that the company had negligently failed to protect
the project and that this proximately contributed to the
damage of Plaintiffs. (R. 728)
The trial judge therefore acted in error by refusing
to enter judgment against Gibbons & Reed in favor of
the Plaintiffs. That error should be corrected by this
Court through an order directing the Trial Court to modify
his judgment to hold Gibbons & Reed liable with the State
and County.
4.

The Trial Judge Denied Gibbons & Reed's
Motions For A Directed Verdict.

Following the close of Plaintiffs' case (and also at
the close of all evidence), counsel for Gibbons & Reed
moved for a Directed Verdict. The Court denied that
motion, stating, (at R. 1461)
I deny the motion at this time. I am going to
submit this to the Jury on Interrogatories.
It is thus clear that the Trial Court believed that Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case at that point of the
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trial. The jury then answered one of the interrogatories
propounded to it that Gibbons & Reed had acted negligently and that the Plaintiffs were damaged thereby.
It should be noted that the jury found that Gibbons
& Reed was not negligent in following the State's plans.
The Record was clear that the State supervised much of
the construction. For this, Gibbons & Reed was not held
accountable. However, in the critical area where Gibbons
& Reed was permitted to exercise its own discretion (protecting the project during construction), the jury found
that Gibbons & Reed was negligent and that the Plaintiffs were damaged thereby. Thus, the jury's verdict is
internally consistent with the Record.
Because the Record supports the jury's findings, Gibbons & Reed should have been held liable under the trial
court's judgment.
POINT

III.

THE STATE AND COUNTY SHOULD BE
HELD LIABLE IN THIS CASE UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF "INVERSE CONDEMNATION"
A. ONE OF PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION
AGAINST THE STATE AND COUNTY WAS
ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED PRIOR TO TRIAL.
The Fourth Cause of Action set out in Plaintiffs'
Complaint (see R. 4) claimed compensation for property
which was "taken or damaged for public use" under
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution. That cause
of action was dismissed before trial. (R. 27)
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Plaintiffs then appealed that ruling and this Court
dismissed the appeals as premature, reserving to Plaintiffs the right to raise the issue at this time. (R. 47)
Because of the importance of this issue with respect to
the ability of Plaintiffs to obtain complete recovery for the
proven wrongful acts of the State, Plaintiffs raise this
issue again and urge this Court to give particular attention to the consideration of this matter.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION
OFFERS NEEDED PROTECTION TO THE CITIZENS IN THIS CASE.
In essence, the doctrine of "inverse condemnation,"
if applied in Utah, would hold the State liable for
damages suffered by the Plaintiffs on the basis of the
Utah Constitution (Article I, Section 6), which requires
the State to compensate a property owner for private property taken or damaged for public use. Cases from other
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine even in situations
where no negligence was found.*
In the present case, however, the jury found that the
improvements constructed here were unreasonably defective or dangerous (Finding D l , R. 727), and that County
was negligent in providing reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the project (Finding I, R. 728). Thus, it
is not necessary to rely upon absolute liability to apply
inverse condemnation in the present case. There exists

* See, e.g., Albert v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129
(1965).
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an adequate basis for establishing the rule based upon
traditional fault concepts.
Without the application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation in this case, the sources from which the Plaintiffs could satisfy their judgment could be severely limited,
resulting in the payment of only a small fraction of their
actual out-of-pocket losses. It is, therefore, essential that
this Court apply this doctrine against the State to insure
that justice is accomplished in this proceeding.
C.

U T A H SHOULD ACCEPT THE DOCTRINE OF
INVERSE CONDEMNATION O N A LIMITED
BASIS WHERE FAULT IS ESTABLISHED.

Plaintiffs are mindful that heretofore this Court has
not applied the doctrine of inverse condemnation.* Nevertheless, on the basis of the reasons set out below, Plaintiffs
respectfully urge that this Court should reconsider its
previously expressed views and apply the doctrine in this
case where fault has been established.
* Utah is in the minority of States which have not yet adopted the doctrine of inverse condemnation. The majority of States with similar
constitutional language have accepted the doctrine. The trend is
clearly in this direction. See, e.g., State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323
P.2d 692 (1958); Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647
(1960); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Bellman v.
Contra Costa County, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 353 P.2d 300 (I960); City of
Atlanta v. Donald, 11 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E. 2d 560 (1965); Raymond
v. State Dept. of Highways, 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375, (1970),
Garver v. Public Serv. Co. of NM.,t 77 N.M. 262 421 P.2d 788
(1966); Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown,
164 N.W. 2d 355 (N.D. 1969); Leslie County v. Davidson, 270 Ky.
705, 110 S.W. 2d 652 (1937); Keck v. Hafley, 237 S.W. 2d 527 (Ky.
1951); Wilson v. State Rd. Dept., 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1967); Oklahoma City v. Wells, 184 Okl. 369, 91 P.2d 1077 (1939); Incorporated
Town of Pittsburg v. Cochrane, 200 Okl. 497, 197 P.2d 287 (1948);
Konrad v. State, 4 Wis. 2d 532, 91 N.W. 2d 203 (1958); Bare v.
Department of Highways, 401 P.2d 552 (Idaho 1965); Heyert v.
Orange and Rockland Utils. Inc., 262 N.Y.S. 2d 123 (1965), N.Y.
Constitution Art. 1, §7; Herro v. Wisconsin Fed. Surplus Property
Develop. Corp., 42 Wis. 2d 87, 166 N.W. 2d 433 (1969).
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1.

Utah Statutory Law Recognizes State
In Cases Where Fault Exists.

Liability

The concept of sovereign immunity in Utah has been
expressly abrogated by statute (63-30-1, et. seq.). Clearly,
therefore, the State does not claim freedom from liability
where facts meet the terms of the statute.
In this case, where fault has been found by a jury
and upheld by the Trial Court Judge, the Constitution
should be interpreted to protect the citizens who have
had their property taken or damaged. To do otherwise,
would result in a taking of private property without adequate compensation. This violates the Utah and Federal
Constitutions.
2.

Highways Are Constructed Even Though Unforeseen Damage To Property Owners Is Possible.

The public need for good highways dictates that these
improvements will be constructed even though it is possible
that property owners will be damaged in the process of
construction. Thus, the State chooses to move forward
with these projects knowing that definite risks exist. In
the present case, the State proceeded with a project which
the jury found was "unreasonably defective or dangerous."
(Finding A, R. 721)
Under these circumstances where the State knew or
should have known that the project would cause damage
to the Plaintiffs, it may be fairly said that the State intended the damage which the Plaintiffs suffered. Where the
State directly and intentionally damages others property,
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damages should be awarded without the arbitrary limit
imposed in this case through the statute. This arbitrary
limit on liability is repugnant to basic due process concepts.
For this reason alone, this Court should apply the
doctrine of inverse condemnation here and thereby sanction liability of the State on a Constitutional, rather than
statutory, basis.
3.

The Damage Here Occurred as a Part of the
Work As Deliberately Planned and Carried Out.

The jury found that there was no intervening force
or Act of God in this case. (Finding G, R. 728) This is not
a situation where a reservoir crumbled in an earthquake
or where some other natural hollocost occurred. N o argument is made here that liability should be imposed
in such cases.
But here, the damage ocurred because of the deliberately planned and executed project of the State with
the assisting negligence of both Salt Lake County and
Gibbons & Reed Company. Under these circumstances,
application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation is
appropriate and just.
4.

The Cost of the Damage In This Case Can Better Be Absorbed by the Taxpayers as a Whole,

The question of who can better bear the burden of this
loss is easy to answer. The Plaintiffs were damaged in
such a way that each separate family was forced to pay
an average of many thousands of dollars per household.
The sources of satisfying the trial court's judgment to
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compensate for the Plaintiffs' losses are limited without
the application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation
(or the finding that Gibbons & Reed is liable).
The damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case
should properly be regarded as an additional cost of the
highway project. When viewed in this light, the damages
to Plaintiffs would increase the total cost of the project
by only a small percentage of the overall project cost.
Certainly, that cost should be absorbed by the entire
tax base rather than just a few homeowners, who through
no fault of their own, were subjected to the inadequacies
of the State, County and Contractor.
5. // Not Fully Compensated, the Plaintiffs Would
Be Forced to Contribute More Than Their Proper Share to the Public Undertaking.
Plaintiffs are taxpayers and do not object to contributing their fair share to the cost of the public highway in
question.
Without adequate compensation, however, each
Plaintiff will be forced by the State to contribute many
times the amount contributed by other citizens to this
same project.
Obviously, this would yield a highly inequitable and
unfair result. The Supreme Court of this State should not
conclude that such a result was intended by the framers
of the constitution nor the drafters of our statutes.
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CONCLUSION
The natural drainage courses were deliberately but
negligently changed to direct the flood waters where they
would not have otherwise gone. The homes and property
of faultless victims were severely damaged as a result of
what the jury determined to be the creation of an unreasonably dangerous and defective improvement. The State
and County collaborated in the assumption of a calculated
risk. But for the heavy rain, their action would have been
considered as economically profitable. Having lost their
gamble, surely neither justice nor the public good require
the sufferer to absorb the loss for either governmental
unit. The jury found both County and State to be negligent. The Contractor was also found by the judges of the
facts to be negligent in failing to protect the project during
construction resulting in damage to the Plaintiffs. T h e
jury's findings being fully supported by the facts, the
trial court exceeded its authority in extricating the County
and Gibbons & Reed from the penalty of their negligence.
This Court should reverse the decision of the Trial
Court Judge and modify the Judgment to conform with
the jury's findings.
DATED: December 2 1 , 1974
Respectfully submited,
BOYDEN & KENNEDY
J O H N S. BOYDEN
J O H N PAUL KENNEDY
GEORGE J. ROMNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-0800
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I hereby certify that three true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief were mailed to each of the individuals
named below by First Class, postage prepaid mail this
23rd day of December, 1974.
Merlin R. Lybbert
David W. Slagel
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellees State of Utah and
County of Salt Lake
Continental Bank Building
Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and
B. L. Dart, Jr.
Ralph L. Jerman
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellees Gibbons & Reed Co.
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Iv J , ^-_1 _ V Ll—/

14 FEB 137S

j. Rad™ c . . . :

...

:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

